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n 264 B.C. Carthage, the most economically dy-
namic polity in the Mediterranean basin, blun-
dered into war with Rome, the region’s most
relentlessly militaristic power. It was a terrible mis-
take. For unlike in our own time when power is a
complex equation of  economic, cultural, and coer-
cive factors, military strength then inevitably
trumped wealth, and after a succession of
three Punic wars, lasting over a century,
Carthage would be utterly obliterated, virtually
expunged from the face of  history. Had the
city quit after the first war, essentially a naval
extravaganza lasting twenty-three years, Rome
might well have acquiesced to Carthage’s con-
tinued existence. But it was the fate of  the city,
which had previously been dominated by mer-
chants and agro-businessmen, to suffer an un-
expected outcropping of  military talent, and
this sealed its doom.
They were the Barcids, a clan of  generals
in a town of  admirals, a family whose abilities,
aggressiveness, and, above all, hatred of  Rome
allowed them to dominate Punic politics and
keep the suicidal grudge match going. The first
prominent member, Hamilcar, had been the
best Carthaginian general in the initial conflict
with Rome. But, unhappy with the peace
terms, he abandoned his mercenary army,
which then revolted against Carthage, leading
to a terrible civil war that ended only after their
original commander annihilated the rebels.
Likely now a controversial figure in Carthage,
Hamilcar received permission to march his
new army across North Africa to Spain, where
he would establish a family enclave based on local
gold and silver mines. Accompanying him was his
nine-year-old son Hannibal, from whom he ex-
tracted an oath of  eternal enmity against Rome—a
curse that would chart the boy’s future.
For it was this Hannibal in 218 B.C. who led the
army he inherited from his father across one of  the
highest passes in the Alps and invaded Italy. Staging
the assault from his family’s base in Spain, now an
empire within an empire, he dragged Carthage into
an entirely problematic war with Rome, one that
would have been destined for a quick and disastrous
end had it not been for one factor: Hannibal him-
self.
Almost immediately he gathered his bedraggled,
freeze-dried near-wreck of  an army and led them to
two sharp victories over the Romans, the last one at
the River Trebia wiping out most of  a major con-
sular army. He followed that up the next spring by
luring another consular army into a trap set along
the shores of  Lake Trasimene, staging the most
lethal single ambush in Western military history.
By now he had Rome’s full attention. The hyper-
warlike city on the Tiber, destined soon to rule the
Mediterranean world, responded by fielding a
crusher of  a field force, basically four consular
armies welded haphazardly together, and invited
Hannibal to fight that. With breathtaking guile on
August 2, 216 B.C., he surrounded it on a plain near
the abandoned town of  Cannae, and then over the
course of  an afternoon chopped it to bits, killing that
day more men than the United States lost in combat
during the entire Vietnam conflict.
For the first and only time he had a chance to
win the war. Maharbal, his audacious cavalry com-
mander, urged him to march on Rome immediately,
arriving before the shock from Cannae could sub-
side, but the boss hedged and the moment was lost.
Instead, Hannibal assumed that the authorities on
the Tiber would be ready to talk terms and sent a
delegation, only to have them thrown back in his
face.
Rome was just getting started. The battle-
scarred veterans who ran the Senate had faith in their
alliances and understood Rome’s central advantage.
In the words of  Fabius Maximus, the city’s shrewdest
military leader: “We are carrying on war in Italy, in
our own country . . . Hannibal, on the other hand, is
in a foreign and hostile land . . . . Do you doubt that
we shall get the better of  a man who is growing
weaker by the day?”
So Rome kept fielding armies, drawing on huge
manpower reserves, and gradually producing better
fighters and generals. Yet to an amazing degree Han-
nibal kept beating them, never losing a significant
battle during his stay in Italy. Still, as the years piled
up, the Roman confederation refused to crack, and
Hannibal found himself  pushed steadily further
south until he occupied just the toe of  the Italian
boot, a stranger in a strange land always. He left fi-
nally in 203, soon to preside over Carthage’s
surrender. Hannibal’s only legacy was his city’s
doom; for the Romans would never forgive or
forget Carthage, utterly destroying the place
and its people in 146 B.C.
So ended history’s most flagrant example
of  winning all the battles but losing the war—
a sort of  military oxymoron that often leaves
armchair strategists scratching their heads. But
such a phenomenon is more than just a freak-
ish occurrence; it can be the starkest barome-
ter of  effectiveness, one that those involved
ignore at their own risk.
Consider the fate of  the Spanish in their
efforts to suppress the rebellious Dutch in the
late 16th century, sending the best and most
experienced army in Europe to the Nether-
lands to deliver a succession of  poundings vir-
tually whenever their hapless adversaries
ventured beyond fortifications. Yet the rebel-
lion refused to be stifled, the Dutch even
seemed to prosper, while the Spanish found
themselves increasingly short of  cash, their
unpaid troops mutinous, and gradually losing
hold of  the situation.
The lessons should have been obvious,
Spain’s power was overextended, it was being
exercised in a hostile environment, military
leverage was nonexistent. When you win all the bat-
tles and still nothing good happens, it should be a
sure sign that the whole operation is not working.
Instead, Spain hung tough and went into centuries of
decline.
Now all this would be academic if  it were not
for the fact that something suspiciously similar keeps
happening to the United States. We find ourselves, it
seems, repeatedly caught in the same trap, trying to
operate in environments where our political pur-
chase is minimal, and then compensating militarily
(winning all the battles), which only obscures our
basic dilemma.
We have a very capable and well-equipped mili-
tary. Consequently, it tends to perform well even
under the most adverse conditions; conditions that
would destroy many other armies. Yet the results fre-
quently range from disappointing to nonexistent. So
our fate in Vietnam was epitomized during negotia-
tions a week before the fall of  Saigon, when an
American general told his counterpart: “You know
you never beat us on the battlefield.” “That may be
so,” the Vietnamese replied, “but it is also irrele-
vant.”
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The tale has been much the same during our in-
cursions into Iraq and Afghanistan, two very uninvit-
ing military environments: first a string of  stunning
victories; then a stubborn and lethal insurgency. For-
tunately, our ground forces had enough adaptability
in their fighting DNA to evolve a fairly good approx-
imation of  an anti-insurgency campaign. But it’s also
important to remember that these forces are prima-
rily designed to fight conventional battles, and those
who control them think in these terms. Their basic
orientation is massive (more troops, more stuff) and
kinetic (as in explosive force).
It’s already pretty clear that this approach can in-
terfere with the political tasks of  gaining local trust
and promoting security; collateral damage and civil-
ian casualties have a way of  doing that. It’s less ap-
parent but still significant that we have been able to
compensate by employing our military crunch as a
kind of  substitute for political adroitness. Through
a combination of  high-tech intelligence and remote
delivery we’ve actually gotten quite good at picking
off  our adversaries’ leadership and inflicting violence
in ways that hurt groups like al Qaeda and the Tal-
iban.
Yet it comes with a huge footprint of  men and
materiel, a price tag that puts an inherent time limit
on this kind of  war in a democracy. We may pay any
price and bear any burden, but not forever, and
everybody knows it. So the insurgents hang on,
knowing we will eventually pick up and leave.
Meanwhile, another American military commu-
nity, a much smaller one centered on special opera-
tions, argues that unconventional warfare—aided by
cultural awareness and political manipulation—can
be waged even in the heart of  Islam and with much
smaller numbers. Such a solution might actually
allow us to maintain a sufficiently low profile to stay
the course and outlast insurgencies that drag on an
average of  twenty-five years. But this is not guaran-
teed. Anti-insurgent thinking remains a work in
progress and the right mix of  ingredients is still an
open question. Nevertheless, it seems abundantly
clear that winning all the battles won’t do it, and, as
hard as it is, we must focus on winning hearts and
minds.
This is extraordinarily ambitious and some
would say naive; but we should be reminded that
some of  the most successful special operators in his-
tory arrived in similarly strange and hostile environ-
ments carrying crosses not guns. These were the
Jesuits who penetrated India, China, and Japan dur-
ing the 16th and 17th centuries, and, through a com-
bination of  flexibility, imagination, and dedication,
worked their way up to the highest reaches of  all
three societies. They fought not a single battle, but
they won many a convert as they climbed.  
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s a term for describing the group of
Americans who have historically sat
atop the economic, cultural, and po-
litical hierarchy in the United States, we could
do a lot worse than “Waspish hetero-patri-
archy.”  Lengthy yes, but also surprisingly
complete, historically grounded, and, if  I do
say so myself, it even has a nice ring to it.  It
serves a particularly important need in the
American context, too, because textbook ti-
tles and national syntheses tell us that the
United States has been in the middle of  an on-
going struggle, a Story of  Freedom within an Un-
finished Nation.  And while historians have
found it relatively easy to identify the groups
doing all that struggling, they rarely identify
who it is these actors are fighting against.  Are
they “white”?  Anglo-Saxon?  Protestant?  The
answer, of  course, is that for most of  Ameri-
can history they were all of  these, and more.
Whiteness has been a perpetual undercurrent,
but “whiteness” takes us only so far, the term
demanding a more thorough definition than
Whiteness Studies scholars have been willing
to give it.1 Anglo-Saxon once reigned supreme,
but it lost its power after Congress changed
the immigration laws in the 1920s and made
many national-origin distinctions moot. And Protes-
tantism, while a perpetual undercurrent like white-
ness, was not always the most overt identity of  those
in power.  Putting all these together, we’re left with
the traditional moniker WASP, but this leaves
out the women’s movement and the gay rights
movement of  the previous three or four
decades.  A more complete term is “Waspish
hetero-patriarchy”; let’s see how it does histor-
ically.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary,
the term WASP was coined only in 1962,
when the civil rights movement required an
oppositional force against which it could
protest. Rather than simply choose “white”
(which would come later, and subsequently
destroy much of  our historical memory), the
social landscape of  the early 1960s demanded
a more inclusive term. WASP is what social
scientists came up with.
What came before WASP as a descriptive
term for the dominant American social and
cultural presence?  During the first three
decades of  the 20th century, the term “Anglo-
Saxon” took on importance as a national so-
cial identity.  The term has deep roots; the
Anglo-Saxons are famed for a 5th-century in-
vasion of  the British Isles.  But at the begin-
ning of  the 20th century there was a need in
America for a term that would differentiate
the social elite from all others.  Anglo-Saxon
served that need.
Why Anglo-Saxon?  For one thing, during the
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